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Robert Stern 
 ǮǡǯǯǯȂ K. E. Løgstrup1 
 
 
If we are going to give nature a place in ethics, do we have to think of it as created by a 
benign and intelligent creator, as otherwise it must remain normatively neutral Ȃ or can 
we find a basis for value and normativity in nature that is independent of any such 
theistic conception? This is obviously a fundamental question in ethics, with a long 
pedigree stretching back through history. My aim in this paper is to outline the issue as it 
figures in the ethics of the Danish twentieth-century theologian and philosopher K. E. 
Løgstrup. I have chosen to discuss his work in this context as I think it raises the question 
in a particularly interesting and acute way; for as we shall see, Løgstrup very much stands 
at the point of tension between these two options, which has made his thinking on this 
issue hard to place. To some, it is obvious that he was a creation theorist, basing his ethics 
on the claim that our lives have been created; but to others, it is equally obvious that this 
is something he was committed to avoiding by offering a secular and humanistic ethics 
instead. My aim here is not to settle that interpretative question conclusively Ȃ which like 
comparable questions concerning the place of religious commitments in thinkers like 
Spinoza, Kant and Hegel is perhaps ultimately unresolvable Ȃ but rather to explore the 
options that are available, thus hopefully shedding light on the kind of complexities this 
question can raise.  
 I am aware, however, that Løgstrup is a relatively little-known figure, and that 
therefore some background is needed. I will thus provide a brief introduction to his life 
and works in the first section. I will then set out his key ideas, where of particular interest 
will be his claims about the relation between ethics and his conception of life Ȃ and 
whether that conception requires us to think of life as created if it is to do the work that it 
required of it within his ethical thinking. Once we see the importance of this issue to 
                                                        
1 K. E. Løgstrup, Beyond the Ethical Demand, translated by Susan Drew and Heidi Flegal, 
edited by Kees van Kooten Niekerk (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2007), p. 
136/System og Symbol: Essays (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1982), p. 114. 
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Þǯǡhis writings raise significant issues that 
are central to this topic: namely, what view we must take of nature if we are to give it any 
import within our ethical theorizing. 
 
1. Locating Løgstrup 
Løgstrup was born in 1905 and died in 1981, and had a significant influence on the 
thought of his native Denmark, and in Scandinavia more generally, though until recently 
he was little known in the wider world.2 Formally educated as a theologian in 
Copenhagen, he also read widely in philosophy, and used the opportunity to travel before 
the Second World War to study with Heidegger and other philosophers. His early reading 
was influenced by Kant and the phenomenological movement (particularly Edmund 
Husserl, Max Scheler, Hans Lipps, and Heidegger himself), as well as by Kierkegaard, in 
addition to Lutheran theology. After a few years as a pastor in the Danish state church, he 
became professor of ethics and philosophy of religion in the theology faculty at the 
University of Aarhus in 1943, where he spent the rest of his academic career. He 
published his first major work Den Etiske Fordring (The Ethical Demand) in 1956 (the 
English translation published by Notre Dame University Press appeared in 1997). He 
published several later books and articles in ethics, theology, metaphysics and philosophy 
of art (where extracts from some of the later ethical writings are translated in Beyond the 
Ethical Demand, University of Notre Dame Press, 2007, and a two volume selection from 
the four volume work on metaphysics was published in translation by Marquette 
University Press in 1995; several more works are available in German, mainly translated 
by his wife, whom he met while studying in Germany before the war).3 
 As this sketch suggests, while coming out of a theological background and being 
engaged with many of the key theological controversies of his time, and while also being 
himself a committed Christian believer, Løgstrup nonetheless insisted on the need to put 
theology in dialogue with philosophy, and equally on the need to explore the relation 
                                                        
2 Philosophers from the English-speaking world who have discussed his work in recent 
times include Alasdair MacIntyre, Simon Critchley, Zygmunt Bauman and Stephen 
Darwall. A bibliography of works on Løgstrup in English is available here: 
http://tinyurl.com/j3xxhhb 
3 Further bibliographiÞǯ
provided in the notes. 
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between ethics, metaphysics, and religious belief. He was therefore explicitly hostile to 
the more conservative theological forces of his period, and what he perceived as their 
irrationalist and exclusivist agendas. At the same time, in reading his work it is important 
to acknowledge that he is not writing as a standard secular philosopher, but is precisely 
concerned to trace the points at which philosophy requires theology and vice versa Ȃ 
where one of those points is the connection between nature, value, normativity and 
creation. I will now explore how Løgstrup handles that connection by looking at three 
central conceptions in his ethics: the radical ethical demand, the idea of life as a gift, and Ǯǯ. 
 
2. The radical ethical demand 
Løgstrup speaks most prominently of a radical ethical demand in his first major work, 
The Ethical Demand, while in later writings from 1968 onwards he talks more about ǮǯȂ though as we shall see, there are important connections 
between the two ideas.  
 Løgstrup introduces the idea of radical ethical demand by reflecting initially on the    ǡ      Ǯ  ǯǤ, he says he wants to make sense of this in more than just ǡǮ[i]f a religious proclamation is not understandable in the sense that 
it answers to decisive features of our existence, then accepting it is tantamount to letting 
ourselves be coerced Ȃ whether by others or by ourselves Ȃ for faith without 
understanding is no   ǯ.4 Thus, he writes later in the book reflecting on 
what he has achieved: Ǯ      ǥȏȐ[to account for it] in a purely 
human maǯ.5 
   ǡ Þǯ  is to examine what ethical outlook is 
embodied in the love commandment by considering in more detail what it is to love the 
neighbour, and then to consider how to make sense of that commandment in terms of 
                                                        
4 K. E. Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, translated by Theodor I. Jensen, revised and edited 
with an introduction by Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1997), p. 2/Den Etiske Fordring (Aarhus: Klim, 2010), p. 10. 
5 The Ethical Demand, p. 207/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 232. 
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Ǯ    ǯǡ6 which include the metaphysical implications of 
taking it seriously. It is then in this second phase of the inquiry that questions concerning 
creation will arise, but where Løgstrup places such questions fundamentally in the 
context of the first phase, of whether such ideas are required to make sense of the ethical 
demand and what he takes this demand to involve. 
 ǡÞ Ǯ    ǯ     Ǯǡ ǡ -  ǯ,7 
characteristics he then goes on to elaborate in the discussion that follows, while also 
adding some further related featuresǡǮǯǡǮǯǡ
that no one has a right to make it Ȃ while all these characteristics set the ethical demand 
apart from conventional social demands and norms. In order to understand what comes 
next, it is therefore important to explain what Løgstrup means by these features of the 
radical ethical demand. 
 In claiming that the ethical demand is silent, Løgstrup means that it cannot be 
articulated in two ways: first, in responding to the needs of another person, you cannot 
just do whatever it is that they ask you to do, as that may not reflect their genuine needs; 
and secondly, you cannot just appeal to established social norms and conventions, as 
there may not be any such norms and conventions governing the case, and even if there 
are, in the ethical situation it is up to you to take responsibility for how you decide to act, 
rather than just relying on such norms. This thus makes the ethical demand radical in the 
sense that you must determine for yourself how to act and bear responsibility for that, as 
opposed to cases where one just follows prevailing conventions. As a result, Løgstrup ǡǮǯ the individual on whom the demand falls, and makes them  Ǯ  ǯǡ         
conventions or what the other person wants.8 Løgstrup also suggests the demand is 
radical in the sense that it can only be fulfilled unselfishly and so may require us to act in 
ways that go against our own interests; this means Ǯurbingly 
                                                        
6 ǮǯǮ§ǯǡǮǯǤÞ ǯǮǯ
into Danish. 
7 The Ethical Demand, p. 5/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 14. Cf. also p. 207/p. 232. 
8 The Ethical Demand, p. 45/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 57. 
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ǯ,9 where we in general prefer to be left to just get on with our lives Ȃ though Løgstrup makes clear that he does not think this radicality should be confused  ǮǯǤ10 ǡ Þ   ǮȏȐ   ȏ 
demand] manifests itself also in the fact that the other person has no right him or herself ǡǯǤ11 The demand 
is also one-sided, he argues, in the sense that it does not involve reciprocity or the right to  Ǯ-ǯǡ        ǡ   entitle me to ask for 
something in return. Fourthly, Løgstrup says that the demand is unfulfillable, but not in 
the sense that it is exorbitant and limitless, but in the sense that if it is felt as a demand 
and thus as something one is required to do, one has already failed as a moral agent, as to 
genuinely love the other is not to feel under any obligation act on their behalf. Finally, in 
addition to these central features of the demand, Løgstrup also mentions that the demand 
is invisible because Løgstrup thinks we can never be entirely sure if we have acted out of 
love for the other, or for more selfish or conventional motives, where this opacity applies 
not just to our understanding of others, but equally to ourselves.12  
 ǡǡÞǮǯ
and the ethical demand it embodies, taking it for granted that the commandment 
corresponds to something many people see as a fundamental ethical norm, which 
Løgstrup summarizes as follows: Ǯ          
other person in a way that best serves his or  ǯ.13 He thus takes himself to 
have brought out how this demand operates and what it asks of us, in ways that he hopes 
we will recognise and acknowledge. Of course, it might still be argued that he has 
mischaracterized the demand, or indeed that there is no such demand Ȃ for example, it 
could be objected that such care has to be reciprocal; that it is based on a corresponding 
right; and that it is too paternalistic in giving insufficient weight to the desires of others in 
                                                        
9 The Ethical Demand, p. 45/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 57. 
10 See Chapter 3, § 2. 
11 The Ethical Demand, p. 45/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 57. 
12 Cf. Chapter 5, § 1. 
13 The Ethical Demand, p. 55/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 68. A slightly better translation 
would be: ǮǯȏȐ
a ǯǤ 
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responding to their needs.14 However, while such questions are certainly pertinent, we 
will not deal with them here, as they are not directly relevant to the focus of this paper,              Þǯ
inquiry: namely, if we accept something like the radical ethical demand as characterised 
above, what are its broader metaphysical commitments? WhǮǯ
and view of the world do we need to take seriously in order to make sense of the ethical 
demand as Løgstrup has presented it to us?15 
 One answer Løgstrup offers is relatively straightforward: namely that the love 
commandment and thus the ethical demand is only really intelligible given the fact that 
we are dependent on one another Ȃ otherwise, it would lose all normative force, as the 
need for care would not arise at all. Thus, the demand would not hold in a world in which Ǯhuman beings were so independent of one another that the words and deeds of one were 
only a dispensable luxury in the life of another and my failure in the life of the neighbour 
could easily be made up laterǯ;16 but of course this is not the case, even though in falsely 
exaggerating our own autonomy and sovereignty, we often overlook this fact, while we 
are also disturbed by the degree in which (as Løgstrup famously puts it) we hold the life 
of other people in our hands, and so try to ignore this dependence as much as we can.17 
As Løgstrup emphasizes, however, as soon as one thinks about such a basic phenomenon 
as trust, one sees immediately the extent to which we rely on others within a thoroughly 
social world, and that without this reliance we would not be the kind of creatures we are. 
 While this claim may be highly plausible, nonetheless Løgstrup thinks that more is 
required to make sense of the ethical demand, where what comes next is more 
controversial. For, Løgstrup argues, a further metaphysical step is needed, namely to Ǯǯ, where it is this step that raises the question about creation with 
                                                        
14 Løgstrup responds to this last worry in Chapter 1, §5. 
15 Løgstrup himself presents the structure of The Ethical Demand in roughly this two ǣǮ	
analyse how the life of one person is interwoven with the life of another, and from this I 
deduce the content of the demand, which has to do with taking care of the life of the other 
person that has been surrendered to us. Some way into the book I make it clear that the 
one-sidedness of the demand cannot be deduced in this way, but presupposes that life ǯȋBeyond the Ethical Demand, p. 10/Kunst og Ethik 
(Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1961), p. 239). 
16 The Ethical Demand, p. 5/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 13. 
17 The Ethical Demand, pp. 15-16/Den Etiske Fordring, pp. 24-26. 
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  ǣ   Ǯ   ǯ     
something given by God, and if so how could this be made consistent with Løgstrup claim Ǯǯǫ
not require any appeal to the notion of a creator at all, in a form that is straightforwardly 
humanistic and secular? As we shall see, there are different answers that one can give to ǡÞǯǤ18 
 
Þǯǡ
address these issue       Ǯ  ǯ    
relation to the ethical demand: how does this idea help us make sense of the demand as 
Løgstrup conceives it, in the same way that taking note of our interdependence helps us 
make sense of it? If we can understand what work the idea Ǯǯis meant to do, 
we can then see what it involves, and thus how far it requires a commitment to a divine 
creator or whether no such theological conception is necessary and we can understand ǮǯǤ19 
 ǡÞǡǮǯ
in to explain three features of the demand: first, why we are required to care for the other 
person at all and what form that care takes; second, why the demand is one-sided and not 
reciprocal; and third, why no one has a right to make the demand for care, even though 
                                                        
18 ǮǯǡÞǮǯǮǯǡǮǯǮǯǢo that while he 
maintains that The Ethical Demand Ǯǯȋ ? ?ǯȌǡǮthe religious truth ǯǮǯ
a human and philosophical ethics in this sense, as they do not involve any specifically 
Christian doctrinal commitments. See Beyond the Ethical Demand, pp. 10-11/Kunst og 
Ethik, pp. 238-40. 
19 ÞǯǮǯ
requires a theological conception, it does not consider whether aspects of the ethical 
demand that do not directly relate to this conception might also require a theological 
interpretation Ȃ ǡÞǯǮǯȋǤThe 
Ethical Demand, p. 171/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 195), where it is again a matter of 
interpretation whether this commits Løgstrup to treating this authority in theistic terms, 
or in a more secular manner. These issues will be discussed elsewhere in Robert Stern, 
The RadicaÞǯ, forthcoming. 
 8 
we are nonetheless required to offer that care to them. Løgstrup argues that insofar as we 
take the ethical demand seriously in these ways, we are implicitly committed to seeing 
life as a gift Ȃ so by understanding the former, we can see what is involved in the latter. 
 As regards the first feature, the idea here is this: the demand requires us to care 
for the other, where that care fundamentally consists in helping their life to go well in 
some broad sense Ȃ        Ǯǯ   
subjective preferences or providing them with sensory stimulation, but enabling them to 
realize their capacities more fully and develop as living beings. Now, one sense in which Ǯǯlife and all that this involves is 
a good thing, rather than a curse,     ǯ    
something of positive value to them, and not harming them or damaging their well-being. Þǯ
be going so badly that one cannot see it as a gift in this way, but rather as something one 
would be better without; but while taking the challenge seriously, he argues that in 
general this cannot be our view of life, as otherwise the ethical demand would have no 
meaning to us.20 On the contrary, he thinks one fundamental conception we have of Ǯǯ Ǯǯ, which is 
precisely their sense that life is good and worthwhile, and something to be fostered and 
developed.21 
 Now, clearly, this first way of thinking about life as a gift Ȃ namely as something 
good, rather than as a curse Ȃ is entirely compatible with a theological conception of 
creation, but would not seem to require it, as the secular humanist could also hold that 
life is a fundamental good which we should foster both in ourselves and in other living ǤǮǯ-creationist terms, 
as just a claim about the value of life, and the disvalue of what frustrates it. 
 Ǯǯ
is its one-sidedness, namely that in responding to your needs and providing care to you, I 
cannot demand anything in return as a quid pro quo. Thus, Løgstrup writes that this ǮȂ upon this presupposition its one-sidedness depends Ȃ that a person has 
                                                        
20 Cf. Chapter 6, §4. 
21 Cf. The Ethical Demand, p. 15/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 24. 
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his life and the world in which it is lived    ǯ,22   ǮȏȐ
one-sided demand contains an ontology, a fundamental and constitutive definition of 
being, namely, that human life and the world that goes with it have been given to human ǯ.23 ǡǡǮǯǯ-sidedness: is a secular understanding sufficient, 
or is something more religious required? 
 From the way in which Løgstrup presents the issues, the first option certainly 
seems available, where he specifies that what it is in life that has been given, namǮ
the different possibilities of life with which the individual has been showered: ǡǡǡǯǤ24 On this basis, he argues, we 
can owe something to the other without having wronged them, but simply because we       ǡ Ǯ        ǡ ǡ  ǡ         ǯǤ25 
Løgstrup insists that this is crucial to his characterization of the ethical demand and 
particularly its lack of reciprocity: 
In other words, the demand which makes void protest from the viewpoint of 
reciprocity does not arise exclusively from the fact that one person is delivered 
over to the other. This demand makes sense only on the presupposition that the 
person to whom the demand is addressed possesses nothing which he or she has 
not received as a gift. Given that presupposition, the demand is the only thing 
which makes sense.26 
What Løgstrup has said so far about life as a gift does seem open to a perfectly secular 
understanding: namely, that we are not ourselves completely responsible for our lives 
and the various good things in them, but that we find these things given to us by the 
possibilities that life itself offers for understanding, adventure and excitement, love, 
discussions with others and so on. And while we can control how some of this goes 
through our various abilities, possessions and advantages, it should be clear to us that 
this control is very limited and that we remain greatly dependent on these possibilities 
                                                        
22 The Ethical Demand, pp. 170-1/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 194 (translation modified). 
23 The Ethical Demand, p. 171 note 2/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 194 note 1. 
24 The Ethical Demand, p. 116/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 134 (translation modified). 
25 Ibid, translation modified. 
26 Ibid. 
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for our lives to go well, as things we are given rather than what we bring about for 
ourselves. Much of what makes up our lives is a gift in this sense, which does not require 
the idea of God as the giver to be intelligible, but just the denial that we are sovereign ǡ ǯ
of nature who are compared to mushrooms that simply spring out of the earth fully 
formed.27 
 The question, then, is whether this secular conception of the gift can do the work 
that Løgstrup requires it to do, which here is to challenge the reciprocity claim; and this 
would seem quite plausible. One form of response might focus on the talents or capacities 
you possess which are called upon in a situation where the ethical demand arises: for 
example, perhaps I suddenly fall ill, and you can use your medical training as a doctor to 
assist me. In terms of reciprocity, you might think I am only entitled to be given that 
assistance if you can ask something from me in return. But if your medical talents are 
something you have received as a gift, in the sense that it is just your good fortune to 
possess them, then arguably you have no right to lay claim to them here as something for 
which you can extract a return from me, and so reciprocity fails. 
 There is, however, an obvious difficulty with this first response, which is that it 
relies on a sense of life being a gift that may seem implausibly strong to many: for while 
of course we recognize that some of our talents and capacities are naturally determined 
in a way that means we cannot claim credit for them, nonetheless we can assert 
ownership over them if we chose to develop them for ourselves, in a way that then 
arguably gives us a right to demand something in return for their use. So, if you have 
trained hard as a doctor and spent many hours devoting yourself to learning your trade, 
you might then reasonably claim something back from me for the medical help that you 
are called upon to provide.  
 Nonetheless, of course, one response to this might be to press the idea of talents 
and capacities further, and to argue that while you may have worked hard to become a 
doctor, nonetheless this very capacity itself, of hard work and dedication, is itself a kind of 
                                                        
27 Cf. Thomas Hobbes, De CiveǡǡȚǣǮLet us return again to the state of nature, 
and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddainly (like 
Mushromes) come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each otherǯǤ 
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gift in the sense that you have been endowed with it from the beginning, and so cannot 
claim credit for the talents you have then been able to nurture as a result. Moreover, your 
path in life as a doctor was no doubt made possible by many kinds of good fortune, such a 
upbringing, education, and cultural influences. In this way, it could be said, in the end 
none of the capacities that I might call upon in making my demand on you are ones you 
can claim to own for yourself, making any Ǯ-ǯǤ 
 ǡÞǯ
territory as familiar debates between John Rawls and Robert Nozick over the relation 
between desert and ability, where Nozick protested against ǯ   
that it treats our abilities and talents as merely a matter of moral luck, which Nozick 
claimed then puts too much pressure on our ideas of personhood and self-ownership.28 
And Løgstrup could be read as simply adopting the more Rawlsian view on this matter, ǯǤ 
 ǡÞǯ
a somewhat different direction. This is the idea that even if Nozick is right and we can 
legitimately claim credit for some of our capacities and abilities, such that on their own 
they might form a basis for reciprocity, nonetheless it is still undeniable that we possess a 
good deal for which we cannot claim credit, thus putting us in debt Ȃ and also that we 
cannot repay anyone for those things, and therefore that I cannot refuse to help people 
unless they repay me because I am in no position to pay off my own debts, making void the 
demand for reciprocity. Thus, for example, I owe my life to my parents, where it is 
arguable that this is a debt to them that I cannot repay; I am therefore in no position to 
refuse help to you in a situation of need unless you can repay that help, or demand 
reciprocity from you here, as so much of what I have has to be treated as a gift that cannot 
be recompensed to anyone. Once this is recognized, by its own logic of justice and debt, 
the demand for reciprocity can be undermined: a person who is a debtor in this way 
                                                        
28 Cf. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 213-31. For 
an outline of these debates, see Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An 
Introduction, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 107-110. 
 12 
cannot refuse to come to the aid of others unless they receive repayment, given how 
indebted they are themselves.29  
 Thus, in considering the one-sidedness of the ethical demand, it seems intelligible 
to Ǯǯǣnsofar as 
the capacities with which you can help others are not fully owned by yourself and come 
to you as a matter of good fortune, while one will always remain in debt to others in a 
manner that cannot be repaid, this then means that you are not entitled to demand 
anything in return for the use of those capacities in responding to individuals who are in 
need. 
 We may now turn to the third feature of the ethical demand which Løgstrup Ǯǯǡobliged to care for us 
in the light of the demand, this is not based on any corresponding right that we possess: 
On the other hand, the other person has no right to make the radical demand that 
everything that I say or do in our mutual relation, I shall say or do for his sake and 
not for my own ǥǡmore or 
less of his life is in my hands, is a fact which has come into being without his 
participation or mine, and without him or I being able to say our piece. He 
therefore cannot identify himself with this Ȃ created Ȃ fact and make the demand 
into his own.30 Ǯǯ
problematic, as indeed the final sentence from this passage suggests. For, it could be 
argued, if we do not ourselves possess this right to make the demand, then surely 
someone must, where the only alternative may then seem to be God as the creator whose 
creation we are, who brings it about that we are interdependent in the first place, and 
who is thus entitled to require that we respond to each other in certain ways, even if we 
cannot demand this ourselves. 
                                                        
29 An argument along these lines has also emerged in some of the literature on birth and 
reproduction: cf. Lisa Guenther, The Gift of the Other: Levinas and the Politics of 
Reproduction ȋǣǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǤ ? ? ?ǣǮs 
done something to earn my response, as if I were merely settling the score or repaying a 
debt, but rather in response to a gift [of birth] that exceeds measure and disrupts the 
logic of reciprocity Ȃ ǯǤ my attention to 
this literature, and to pointing out its possible connections with Løgstrup. 
30 The Ethical Demand, p. 46/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 58 (translation modified) 
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 However, Þǯ
possible, I now want to suggest that there is another alternative, which we will be able to 
see more clearly if we turn from The Ethical Demand      ǮǯǤ 
 
3. The sovereign expressions of life ǡǮǯ
in The Ethical Demand, but is first used in Opgør med Kierkegaard (Controverting 
Kierkegaard) in 1968. However, as we shall see, there is still a fundamental continuity in Þǯ  Ǥ W      ǡ  ǮǯǡǡǡǤ31  
Firstly, we might ask what makes openness, trust, mercy and so on into Ǯ  ǯǫ      Ǯǯǡ  Ǯǯ   ǮǯǮǯǮǯȂ so the suggestion here is 
that this is how life articulates itself, or properly realizes itself. Thus, through our 
following norms of trust, openness, mercy and the like, life comes to its full expression 
through us, as our capacities for life are realized Ȃ and it is because this is the case that 
they are norms in the first place. By contrast, opposed to these sovereign expressions of 
life are alternative forms of acting and thinking that are life-denying and constraining, 
such as distrust instead of trust, hate instead of love, reserve instead of openness, despair 
instead of hope. Løgstrup calls attitudes of this sort Ǯǲǳ  ǲǳǯ32 because they turn the individual back in on themselves in a way that is 
both harmful to the individual and to the community more generally. On the other hand, Ǯǡǡ  
expressions of life and identifyǯ,33 while they also enable us to live 
together successfully: Ǯions of life exist to allow our coexistence 
and communal life to endure and develop. They are summoned forth by the very       ǥ ȏȐ  ȏ   Ȑ
                                                        
31 Cf. Beyond the Ethical Demand, p. 125/System og Symbol, p. 105 and Beyond the Ethical 
Demand, p. 128/System og Symbol, p. 107. 
32 Cf. ibid and Beyond the Ethical Demand, p. 51/Opgør med Kierkegaard (Aarhus: Klim, 
2013), p. 95. 
33 Beyond the Ethical Demand, p. 54/Opgør med Kierkegaard, p. 99. 
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preferable to trust, hate to love, lies to truth, then coexistence and communal life cease. 
We can undermine the expressions of life, and we do, but not without life being 
destroyed. If trust, openness, compassion between us vanished and no longer broke 
through our attempts to destroy them, we would be done ǯǤ34 
 SecondlyǡǮǯǫ
idea is that we ourselves do not bring it about that the world contains trust, openness in 
speech, mercy and so on, in the way that we bring it about that people can get married or 
that they can own property: rather, unless life already followed these norms, it would not 
be possible at all. Thus, as Løgstrup puts it: Ǯ
will; its realization takes the will by surprise. It is one of those offerings in life which, to 
our good fortune, preempts us, and in whose absence we should be unable to carry on 
from     ǯ.35       Ǯǯǡ Þ
therefore means to contrast this with claims that we might be tempted to make about our 
sovereignty over these norms as their creators or instigators, which he holds are 
inapplicable here Ȃ a mistake he thinks is made by the character Ulrich from Robert ǯ The Man Without Qualities: Ǯǥ assumes that we are a species of worldless 
individuals, ourselves the authors of our goals36 Ȃ as though there were not a challenge 
that proceeds to us from the world and its order. The ethical point of view is not a 
product of our aspirations but a backlighting effect that illuminates them, engendered by              ǯ.37 Thus, ǡÞǣǮǡ
but not in the sense that I invest it with its definitive character. My speech is indeed mine, 
and it is indeed up to me whether I will be open in my speech, but it is not I who have 
brought it about that the definitive feature of speech is its openness. If I deceive another 
or raise my guard, I challenge the definitive feature of speech which attaches to it in ǡǡǯǤ38 
                                                        
34 Beyond the Ethical Demand, pp. 128-9/System og Symbol, pp. 107-8. 
35 Beyond the Ethical Demand, p. 68/Opgør med Kierkegaard, p. 116. 
36 Ǯ¤ǯǡǮǯǮǯǤ 
37 Beyond the Ethical Demand, p. 95/Norm og Spontaneitet (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 
1972), p. 29. 
38 Beyond the Ethical Demand, p. 55/Opgør med Kierkegaard, p. 100. 
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 Now, it is this idea that sovereignty belongs to the expressions of life, and not to 
us, that I think can be helpful in opening up a more Þǯ
claim concerning the ethical demand on which we have been focusing, namely Ǯthat the 
other person has no right to make the radical demand that everything that I say or do in 
our mutual relation, I shall say or do for his ǯǤ39 For, it can now be 
seen that the fundamental contrast Løgstrup is drawing in this passage is between a 
socially constituted contractual situation where he thinks we do possess such rights as 
something that has been agreed upon between us, and the situation of the ethical demand 
which comes into being independently of any such agreement, and (like the sovereign 
expressions of life) is not normatively constituted in this way: 
The radical character [of the demand] manifests itself also in the fact that the 
other person has no right to make the demand, even though it has to do with the 
care of his own life. Such demands as the other person Ȃ on their own behalf Ȃ has 
a perfect right to make are of an entirely different nature. They are conditioned by 
the social norms and standards Ȃ moral, legal, and conventional Ȃ that are implied 
in our life together with and over against one another. They are well-founded 
demands of which the other person is either conscious and which he or she is able 
to formulate, or of which he or she could have been conscious and which he or she 
could have been able to formulate. At any rate he can lay claim to these demands 
because he is fully within his right to assume that he and I are in agreement 
concerning the validity of the morality, the law, and the convention in question. If 
his demands hold good he must therefore also be able to show that they 
correspond to the social norms. 
 On the other hand, the other person has no right to make the radical 
demand that everything that I say or do in our mutual relation, I shall say or do for 
his sake and not for my own. This is precisely a demand regarding which we have 
not  Ǥ         ǮǯǮǯǤThe fact out of which the demand arises, namely 
that more or less of his life is in my hands, is a fact which has come into being 
without his participation or mine, and without him or I being able to say our piece. 
                                                        
39 The Ethical Demand, p. 46/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 58 (translation modified). 
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He therefore cannot identify himself with this Ȃ created Ȃ fact and make its 
demand into his own.40 
Thus, for example, if I am a patient in a hospital, I have the right to demand that the 
doctor sets aside their own interests (within limits) and devote themselves to caring for 
me; but, Løgstrup seems to be suggesting, that right only holds because we are operating 
within a contractual situation in which the have agreed to relate to each other in this 
manner, as a result of this constructed social norm. However, the obligation to care 
represented by the ethical demand does not arise in this way, where in this respect it is 
akin to the sovereign expressions of life, which we do not and cannot constitute for 
ourselves, which means that the right to care cannot be said to apply here. 
    Þǯ       ǡ  
thus see how he can conceive of certain normative structures of care being given rather 
than brought about in a contractual manner, as something we do not ourselves create but 
which are always already in place Ȃ and precisely because we do not create them for 
ourselves, Løgstrup argues, talk of a right to this care is misplaced.41 Thus, because the 
ethical demand differs fundamentally from social norms and conventions which we bring 
about for ourselves,42 this means that while we can talk about an entitlement to make the 
demands associated with the latter, we cannot assert a right to the kind of care and 
concern associated with the ethical demand, even though others are required to show 
                                                        
40 The Ethical Demand, pp. 45-6/Den Etiske Fordring, pp. 57-8 (translation modified). 
41 Of course, the conception of rights that Løgstrup is operating with here could be 
challenged, and on different conceptions his position might look less plausible; but that 
issue is not relevant to our purposes here, where it is the way he employs his view of 
rights to contrast social norms with sovereign expressions of life that is of primary 
significance to our current concerns. 
42 This theme can be seen to be present not just in Løgstrup later discussion of sovereign 
expressions of life, but also in The Ethical Demand ǣǤǮTrust is not of our own 
making; it is given. Independently of us, our life is created in such a way that it cannot be 
lived in any other way than that the individual, through trust that is either shown or 
desired, delivers himself to the other person and thereby places more or less of his life in ǯ(The Ethical Demand, p. 18/Den Etiske Fordring, pp. 27-8, translation 
modified)ǡǮWe may compare natural love with the trust which is a basic part of 
human ǤǣǨǥ	
this reason trust and love also contain an understanding of the fact that our life and the 
person who is the object of our love ǯȋThe Ethical Demand, 
pp. 138-9/Den Etiske Fordring, pp. 158-9). 
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ǤǡǮǯ
in the sense that it is given to us by God who then has a right to make this demand in a 
way that we do not, but rather that life has forms of normativity that we do not bring 
about through our human practices, but which are given to us prior to those practices, in 
ways which (Løgstrup thinks) rule out any talk of rights in this context. Thus, as has been 
suggested by Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre, it is possible to argue that what Løgstrup Ǯgiven in the ordinary ǯǡ43 in 
contrast to the social norms and conventions which we construct for ourselves; for as we 
have seen, it is arguably     Ǯ   ǯ which Løgstrup is 
appealing to when he claims that the ethical demand does not rest on the rights of the 
person to whom care is owed.  
 
3. A religious interpretation? ǡǮǯ
is both secular and can do the work that Løgstrup wants it to do in relation to the ethical 
demand, we now need to consider an important challenge that may seem to come from 
Løgstrup himself: namely, does it make sense to think of life as structured by sovereign 
expressions of life such as trust, mercy, openness of speech and so on, unless we think of 
life as created by a benign Godǫ     Ǯǯ
constructed by us, how can they be inherent in life itself simply as such, unless that life 
was brought into being with certain purposes by a creator? As John Cottingham has 
argued recently: 
To spell it out more explicitly, if the pattern after which we are shaped, whether 
we like it or not, is one that allows us true fulfilment only if the love that is deep in 
                                                        
43 	ǡǮǯǡThe Ethical Demand, pp. xv-xxxviii, ǤǤ	ǡǤǡǮǫǤǤÞǯ
ǯ
Kooten Niekerk (eds), Concern for the Other: Perspectives on the Ethics of K. E. Løgstrup 
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2007), pp. 177-206; see also the reply by ǣǮǯǲǫǳǯǡ
pp. 207-16. 
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our nature wells up and overflows towards our fellow-creatures, only then have 
we the highest and most compelling reasons to live in accordance with that love.44  	ǡǮǯǮǯ
the exercise of that love; if there were no such pattern, the reason to love the other would 
be weakened, and could be overridden by reasons stemming from our own interests and 
concerns, making love optional rather than required. On this account, therefore, without a Ǯǯǡ
ethical demand and the sovereign expressions of life would seem to lose their force. 
 Now, it may seem that Løgstrup is in agreement with a view of this sort, and thus 
in the end his account of ethical normativity is also based on a claim about the created 
status of life. For, in several places Løgstrup writes that Ǯǯǡand where his account of that interpretation may seem to imply 
that he would accept ǯ, so that he too endorses a 
creationist conception of ethics: 
Unlike all those things which we ourselves have created through established 
institutions, such as manufactured products and technological apparatuses, 
expressions of life Ȃ thanks to their goodness and appeal Ȃ suggest a religious ǥȏȐexpressions of life originate in 
the power to exist which we ourselves are not but which is closer to us than we 
are to ourselves.45 
Like Cottingham, we may take Løgstrup as arguing here that ultimately, because the 
sovereign expressions of life do not come from us, but are the way in which life is 
designed by a power that has created it, that this is what gives them their normative force 
                                                        
44 John Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion: Towards a More Humane Approach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 86. Cf. also John Cottingham, The 
Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy and Human Value (Cambridge: Cambridge ǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǤ ? ?ǣǮ	ǥn of eternal and necessary 
value, a divine reality that infuses all possible worlds; the purposes of God are necessarily 
good, and the nature of human beings, qua created beings, is such that that they can only 
be truly fulfilled by living in conformity wiǯǤ 
45 K. E. Løgstrup, Metaphysics, volume 1, translated by Russell L. Dees (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1995), pp. 90-2/Skabelse og Tilintetgørelse: Metaphysik IV: 
Religionsfilosofiske Betragtninger (Aarhus: Klim, 2015), pp. 115-6 (translation modified). 
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which otherwise they would lack, so that Løgstrup is committed to a theistic ethics after 
all. 
 NonethelessǡÞǯǡ
are also reasons to think that once again his view is more complex than this suggests Ȃ 
where this complexity arises in determining what precisely it is about the sovereign     Ǯ   ǯǤ  an account like ǯǡwhat does so is the very normativity of those expressions of life, as in his   Ǯǯ         
ǯ   Ǥ46 However, it is not 
clear that Løgstrup himself would go as far as this, as he seems to hold that the needs of 
the other are sufficient in themselves to generate a reason of this sort, making us 
responsible for others in a way that does not require us to think that our lives together 
have been created by God. For example, in The Ethical Demand, he speaks of trust as ǣǮAs surely as a person with the trust he either shows or desires gives more or less 
of his life [liv] into the other's hand, so surely does the demand to take care of this 
person's life ȏȐȏ§ȐǯǤ47 Here, it would 
seem, the normative basis for the demand to respond appropriately to the trusting 
person, is that she has made herself vulnerable through this display of trust, thereby 
giving rise to the demand to respond appropriately and offer the kind of care that is 
hereby required. It would thus seem that it is this responsibility for others in conditions 
of this kind that generates the demand, regardless of any appeal to issues of creation. 
Likewise, in outlining  Ǯ ǯ  ǮǯǡÞ   Ǯ   ȏȐ      
that the existence of human beings is intertwined with each other in a way that demands 
of human beings that they protect the lives of others who have been placed in their ǯǤ48 ǡ Ǯǯ
                                                        
46 For a similar view, cf. Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian Ethics ȋǣǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǤ ? ? ?ǣǮǯǤ 
47 The Ethical Demand, p. 17/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 27 (translation modified). 
48 ǤǤÞǡǮǯǡThe Ethical Demand, 
pp. 265- ? ?ǡǤ ? ? ?ȀǮǯǡZeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 57 (1960), 
pp. 357-91, p. 387. 
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generates the demand on us that comes through trust and the other sovereign 
expressions of life, in a way that is apparently sufficient to explain that normativity of that 
demand for Løgstrup, without any appeal to the idea of creation. 
 However, if this is right, what can he mean by saying that Ǯ  ǯǫ Ǯǯ
about because we need to ground their normativity in a creationist picture, how else can Ǯǯǫed if we see that for Løgstrup, 
even if the normativity of the ethical demand and the sovereign expressions of life do not 
require us to think that life is created, nonetheless we still need an explanation of how 
and why it is the case that the world is so ordered as to make trust, mercy and so on 
possible, namely how it is that the world is hospitable to the good in this way. This is 
essentially a metaphysical question, not a normative or axiological one Ȃ and to answer it Ǯa religious interpretation is suǯ, in the sense that creation can be said to offer an 
account of this metaphysical fact, though of course it does not amount to a proof, which is  Þ      Ǯǯ    Ǯǯ. Thus, as 
Løgstrup puts it in System og Symbol (System and SymbolȌǣ Ǯ  
unconditional as an expression of life comes from the universe, the thought springs to         ǯǤ49 That is, given that life for us 
would be impossible without the sovereign expressions of life being operative in the 
world, this suggests that the universe is not indifferent to us but has been created in such 
a way as to make this life possible. Nonetheless, the expression of life does not rest on or 
require a religious commitment to creation to ground its normativity as such; this is taken    Þǯ ǡ           
hospitality of the universe to this normativity, for otherwise it might seem too incredible 
for it to be ordered along these lines, as a world in which these goods are realized. It is   
ǯ     makes the sovereign expressions of life good at an 
axiological or normative level, but that he created the universe is nonetǮǯ
by them insofar as we live in a universe in which they can be fulfilled and upheld. If we 
take this approach, we can then see how Løgstrup can hold that ethics may well have 
implications for the question of creation, but that nonetheless the former does not rest on 
                                                        
49 Beyond the Ethical Demand, p. 139/System og Symbol, p. 117. 
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the latter, but on our nature as living creatures caught up in relations of interdependence 
and care.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
